

to be laid away in

R E A S O N S

FOR AN

AUGMENTATION

OF THE

A R M Y

ON THE

IRISH ESTABLISHMENT,

OFFERED TO THE

CONSIDERATION

OF THE

P U B L I C.

D U B L I N:

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M D C C L X V I I I .



R E A S O N S
FOR AN
A U G M E N T A T I O N
O F T H E
A R M Y, &c.

THE long expected Proposal for the Augmentation of the Army on this Establishment, which has for some Time past so much engaged the Attention of our News Writers and Pamphleteers, has at length been laid before both Houses of Parliament, and from the different Reception it has met with in each of those August Assemblies, as well as from the very respectable Minority, which supported it, where it passed in the Negative, the candid and impartial Publick will judge of it as a Measure which has many weighty Reasons to recommend it, notwithstanding the Objections that may be urged against some of the Circumstances attending the Form, in which it was at first proposed.

A 2

To

To differ from the Voice of the legislative Body of the Kingdom, is a Presumption in any one, except the Royal Head of that Body, to whom alone that Prerogative is reserved; but when a Measure is approved of by a very large Majority in one House, and the Opinions of the other House, (whose Existence depends upon the Approbation of their Constituents) were so nearly equal upon this interesting Subject, notwithstanding the very critical Time, wherein it was submitted to their Consideration; the Sense of that small Majority, by which it was rejected, can by no Means be considered as the Sense of Parliament; even tho' we were not to take into the Account certain personal Motives, which might operate at this Juncture to procure that Majority, and which are of too delicate a Nature to be explained.

THE Opinion therefore of the Publick, as to the Measure in Question, is still as free, as it was before what hath passed, and I apprehend that it still lies equally open to Discussion.

To consider therefore its true Nature—to remove the chief Objections, that have been urged against it—and to shew the great Advantages that will attend it, to this Kingdom in particular, as well as to his Majesty's Service in general, is the Design of the following Sheets; in the perusal of which, I must beg my Reader's close, as well as candid Attention.

It will be necessary to begin this Subject, by first explaining the Reasons of State, upon which this Design of an Augmentation of the Army upon the *Irish* Establishment, is founded.

THE

THE large Accession of Territory to the *British* Dominions, since the last Peace, has so greatly encreased the Number of our Forts and Garrisons abroad, that it appears by a Review of the Army, as it is at present stationed, that near Half of our Troops are constantly employed upon that Service: It has been a Grievance long and justly complained of, that those brave Regiments, who have borne the Burthen and Heat of the Day, whose Valour has acquired to their Country those Dominions, which they are left to defend, have been suffered to languish from Year to Year in a Sort of honourable Exile, till either Sickness and Mortality had consumed them, or old Age rendered them unfit for Service; while their Officers forgotten by their Friends at Home, and continually supplanted in their Pretensions by Competitors more happily situated near the Fountain of Preferment, seldom rose in their Profession, in any Degree of Proportion to their standing and Merits: A hard Case, that serving their Country in its most essential Concerns, and by the most dangerous and disagreeable Service, should prove an Obstruction instead of a Help to their Advancement!

FEW People who have Relations or Friends in these Circumstances are ignorant of the Reality of this Grievance, which has been so long felt and lamented;—A Grievance, for which no adequate Remedy can be provided, except by establishing a regular Rotation of the Army of these Kingdoms, in such a Manner, as that every Regiment shall take an equal Share of the Service, relieving and being relieved in their respective Stations through every Part of his Majesty's extensive Dominions: This Plan has at length happily been adopted by the *British* Government, who, from Motives of Wisdom

Wisdom as well as Justice and Humanity, have determined, that one Half of our Army shall no longer be condemned to a hopeless Exile abroad, while the other remains in Ease and Quiet at Home, but that a certain Number of Regiments on foreign Service shall annually be relieved by an equal Number from *Great-Britain and Ireland*.

THE great Utility and Propriety of this Plan of Rotation will appear, if we consider that by this Means all possible Partiality will be precluded; every Regiment must take its Turn in the more difficult as well as in the easier Parts of the Service, however considerable the Interest of its Colonel may be; and no one will be deprived of the Happiness of returning to their native Country, when they have fulfilled the Term of their Duty abroad: — A Term, which will be very moderate in its Duration, and even appear the shorter from the Certainty of its Period: By this Means, the whole Army will gradually become inured to every Kind of Service; in the Field, the Camp, and the Garrison; in a much more effectual Manner than at Home, tho' under the Discipline of the most skilful Martinet: Accustomed to the Changes of Climate, (which they may encounter with much less Danger in Time of Peace, when the Duty is easy and all proper Necessaries are provided for them) and acquainted with those Countries, which it may be their Fortune hereafter to be a second Time sent to defend; in short, in a few Years, we shall have an Army of experienced Veterans dispersed through every Part of the *British Empire*.

THIS

THIS excellent Plan has been adopted for some Time past, and the Execution of it in some Degree attempted ; but the Circumstances, that at present attend the different Establishments of these Kingdoms, must render the Continuance of it next to impracticable, as well as defeat the principal Ends, which it was meant to answer, except some means be found to remove those Inconveniences, which at this Time attend it.

To explain this properly, it will be necessary to lay before my Readers a short State of the Establishment of *Ireland*, and to compare it with that of *Great-Britain*, as each of them now stands.

THE *Irish* Establishment consists of 4 Regiments of Horse, 8 of Dragoons, and 30 Regiments of Foot, of which 6 have been kept on foreign Stations, and paid by *Ireland*. This may appear, at first Sight, a formidable Army, and so it wou'd be, if the Regiments consisted of a Number of private Men suitable to the usual Idea of a Regiment, which commonly amounts to 500 Men, but here a Regiment of Foot, when compleat, does not consist of above 328 Men, the Companies being reduced at the last Peace to 28 private, and the commissioned and warrant Officers making up the Remainder ; this Reduction, notwithstanding the Inconveniences that have since followed it, arose from Motives of the very best Kind, Policy and Justice.

THE present State of *Europe*, whose Princes all keep numerous Armies in constant Pay to the utmost of their respective Abilities, has obliged *Great-Britain*, (whose Constitution will not suffer her to do

do the same) to model her Army in such a Manner, as to enable it to become respectable and useful, as soon as possible, when any sudden Emergency may call upon her to exert her Force in her own Defence, or in that of her Allies. The Raising of new Regiments is always attended with very great Expence; nor can they be qualified for Service in so short a Time, as it takes to discipline additional Men, assisted by the Instruction of Veteran Officers, and the Example of experienced Fellow Soldiers. The Utility, therefore, of this Plan of Reduction greatly compensates for the extraordinary Expence; which after all is not near so great as it appears; as the supernumerary Officers would have been entitled to half Pay, if they had been reduced.

ANOTHER Motive for this Plan of Reduction arose from a Principle of Justice to those brave Officers, whose Valour had attained to their Country the glorious Advantages, of which she was in Possession at the Close of the last War.—Many of them had impaired their Health in her Service;—Many of them had purchased their Commissions;—Many had no other Means of Subsistence, except their Pay;—and All in general must be supposed to be influenced by the laudable Ambition of rising in that Profession, which they had chosen in their Youth; and had thereby precluded themselves from embarking in a different Way of Life, till it was too late:—All Hopes of which must have been cut off by their being reduced to half Pay.

THE 10th of King *William*, having limited the Number of Troops to be kept up in *Ireland*, to 12000 Men; and national Oconomy, after an expensive War, having compelled *Great-Britain* to reduce

reduce her Troops to 17535 Men ; Government was induced so to model the Armies of both Kingdoms upon the Reduction at the late Peace, as to preserve as many Officers as possible, and to reduce the Number of the private Men, so as not to exceed upon the whole, the Numbers above specified, Officers included ; nor was it any Hardship on the private Men, as they cou'd easily turn themselves to more lucrative Employments than that of a common Soldier, and most of them were well pleased to obtain their Discharge.

THIS Plan has of late been much censured for its Want of Frugality, but surely the Motives for adopting it at that Time, were highly expedient on National Principles ; and even those of a more Private Nature were such as might well plead its Apology ; tho' they are daily growing less and less forcible, as the Number of those Officers, who deserved that their Country shou'd make this Sacrifice to their Merit, must have greatly diminished within these last five Years, and will continue to lessen every Day.

BUT there are other and more material Inconveniences than the Expence which have attended this Plan of Reduction. The Regiments in *Great-Britain* at present consist of 529 Men each ; whereas the Foot Regiments on the *Irish* Establishment amount to only 328, as I before observed ; and in Consequence of this Disproportion, whenever an *Irish* Regiment is ordered to *Great-Britain*, or to a foreign Station, it becomes necessary, before it leaves this Kingdom, to compleat it to the Establishment of that Place, to which it is going : this can only be done two Ways, either by enlisting a Number

ber of Recruits for that Purpose, or by drafting a sufficient Number from the other Regiments, which are to stay here, and leaving them to make up the Deficiency at Leisure ; but, by both of these Methods, the Service must suffer considerably ; the first is indeed next to impracticable from the Time it must take to effect it : And were it otherwise, yet so great a Proportion of raw undisciplin'd Men must render a Regiment unfit for Service, until they are properly made ; and that must be the Work of a considerable Time.

By the other Method of Drafting, the Service abroad is provided for ; yet the Army at Home is perpetually torn to Pieces and broke down. No sooner is a Regiment properly disciplin'd and compleated, but these Calls come upon it, and reduce it to a worse Condition than even a Defeat wou'd do ; the Officers see with Regret, their Skill and Labour lost, (not indeed to their Country) but at least to that particular Corps, to which they may be allowed to be partial ; their own Credit depending so much upon its Appearance and Character ; nor is the Mortification, which the Officers must feel on this Occasion, the only, or even the principal Evil of this Practice ; the Army itself is so continually weaken'd by it, that we never know what Number of Troops we have ; nor, consequently, on what we may depend for our Security ; And in Case of any Emergency, (which no one can say how soon may happen) the Kingdom may severely feel the ill Effects of its weak and disordered State, when it may be too late to redress it.

OUR

OUR Army has most notoriously suffered under this Grievance for many Years past. — A Grievance which must ever subsist, except the two Establishments are put upon the same footing, by lessening the Numbers of private Men in *Great-Britain*, and encreasing the Numbers of private Men in *Ireland*; and in that Case, the Evil will be removed, together with its Cause; the Force of this Kingdom will then be always as great as it appears;—the Regiments compleat in their Numbers and perfect in their Discipline, and the Officers eased from the Toil of training Men for the Use of other Corps, will enjoy the Credit and the Comfort of their Labours.

THIS is a true, and, I hope, a clear Exposition, of the Motives which have induced Government to propose an Alteration in our Establishment, and of the real Advantages that must attend it, both to the Service in general, and to this Kingdom in particular.

BUT it may be said, that admitting the Propriety of this Alteration, why are we to augment our Army for that purpose? Why may not *Great-Britain* take off our Hands such a Number of Regiments as shall be equivalent to the additional Men she wants us to raise, and place them upon her own Establishment? To this it may be answered, that as to three Regiments she means so to do; and in the next place, that *Great-Britain* has not the same Necessity for an Augmentation that we have. She has already a much more numerous Army at home, and has no intestine Enemies to dread.

THE

THE number of her People constitute her National Strength, and she might with Safety entrust Arms in the Hands of all such as were capable of using them. She is besides continually surrounded by her Fleets, always in readiness to protect her Coasts upon the least Alarm; which renders her, notwithstanding her Vicinity to *France*, far less accessible to Invasion than we are, and consequently less liable to be attack'd. It is an invidious Task to enlarge upon the very different Circumstances of our own Country in every one of these Particulars; which are well known however to every thinking Person; Circumstances which all tend to invite an Enemy to attack *Ireland*, preferable to any Part of the *British* Dominions, if they had Hopes of finding us unprepared to receive them; and doubtless we have every Reason to expect that they would meet with Assistance from our own discontented and disaffected fellow Subjects.

IN this critical Situation we are, and must continue, till the *Protestant* Interest here becomes equal in Strength, if not in Numbers, to it's Enemies; Enemies, which have always been so ready to shew themselves, when they have had any foreign Assistance to support them, that we may truly say, we owe our present Security, and the Preservation of our happy Constitution, chiefly, if not solely, to our Connexion with *Great-Britain*, and the ~~Protection~~ ^{Privileges} of taking her Forces into our Pay for our Defence. For there is no good Reason can be assign'd, except the foregoing, Why the Religion of the Majority is not in this Country, as well as in others the Religion of the State; as it would soon become, if once the Protection of *Great-Britain* was withdrawn.

IN

IN these Circumstances our best and most secure Defence is an Army, recruited with *English* Protestants, to whom we not only continually owe some Improvement in our Manufactures and Husbandry, but also a farther Encrease to the *Protestant* Interest, from those who settle here and leave Families behind them. The Descendants of *English* Soldiers, are now a very considerable Part of that Interest; and the same Cause is daily adding Strength to it, tho' in a more imperceptible Degree.

As to our Liberties being in Danger from a standing Army, past Experience shou'd convince us of the Folly and Injustice of such a Surmise. — An *English* Army will no more join in depriving their fellow Subjects of their Liberties at this Time, than they wou'd in the Time of K. *James*, but wou'd, like their brave fellow-Soldiers *then*, renounce the Service of a Prince, who wou'd attempt to employ them on so unnatural an Enterprize; especially when we consider how large a Proportion of their Officers are Natives of this Kingdom, and connected with it by every Tie of Interest and Affection.

THIS being admitted, I need not take up the Readers Time to shew, that a less Number than 12000 Men constantly resident cannot be considered as a sufficient Army to secure this Kingdom from intestine Commotions, and to defend it against a foreign Enemy.

THE Parliament of *Great-Britain* thought so, at a Time when their Jealousy of trusting too much Power in the Hands of the Crown run highest; even

even when they obliged their great Deliverer, King *William*, to disband that Army, to which they owed their Preservation ; and to dismiss those few favourite Guards, whom he had brought with him to attend his Person, tho' he pleaded strongly to retain them : And notwithstanding their determined Resolution to reduce the King's Army as low as possible, consistent with the publick Safety ; they yet suffered him to keep 12000 Men for the Defence of *Ireland* ; a plain Proof that they thought a less Number inadequate to that Purpose.

THE Necessity of the Service, and the great Encrease of the *British* Dominions since that Time, has obliged Government to draw out of *Great-Britain* and *Ireland* so many Men, as hath greatly lessen'd that Force at Home, which was then judged absolutely necessary for the Security of both Kingdoms ; and this Circumstance hath appeared in so strong a Light to the *British* Parliament, as to induce them to repeal a Clause in the Statute of the 10th of King *William*, to enable us to make the proposed Augmentation, tho' at the same Time, they have preserved such an Attention to prevent the Encrease of the Army to more than what Necessity requires, as to have limited the Augmentation to 15235 Men in the whole.

THUS much may suffice, as to the Utility and Advantage of the Measure in Question ; *First*, on Account of the intended Rotation of all the Regiments of both Establishments, thro' their several Stations, foreign and domestick ; a Plan, which cannot be properly carried into Execution, but by putting the two Establishments upon the same Footing.

Secondly,


Secondly, To prevent the fatal Consequences of Drafting from the Regiments at Home, to compleat those which are ordered to the other Establishment; by which Practice, the Army of *Ireland* is continually broke to Pieces, and rendered unfit for Service.

Thirdly, To provide for the national Defence of this Kingdom, without depriving it of its most useful Hands; for which Purpose a less Number than 12000 Men constantly resident is certainly not sufficient.

I FLATTER myself that my Reader is by this Time of Opinion, that this Measure is in itself a most salutary and desirable One, on every Account above mentioned; If it can be carried into Execution, without loading this Kingdom with an Expence, which at present it cannot conveniently bear; the Address of the H—— of C—— seems to imply the same, and even to give Hopes, that they wou'd not be averse from reconsidering it, if they were to meet again, upon a future Occasion.

BUT on a Review of the present State of the publick Revenue, and the annual Charges upon it, I believe it will appear, that there will be a sufficient Fund to carry this most national and useful Scheme into Execution, without having Recourse to Parliament for any farther Aids for that Purpose, and without laying any additional Burden upon the Subject.

An



An ESTIMATE of what the NATIONAL REVENUES will be deficient in answering the Expences, in the
Two Years ending at *Lady-Day*, 1769.

CHARGE of the Civil Establishment for Two Years	l.	s.	d.	CHARGE of the Military Establishment for Two Years, including Ordnance	l.	s.	d.
—	266107	1	7	—	1428333	4	—
Charge of the Military Establishment for Two Years, including Ordnance	966882	3	5	and old Additional Duties for Two Years, taken at a Medium, for six Years last past	12790	—	—
Payments pursuant to Act of Parliament	118543	6	11	Poundage of the Additional Duties.	57467	—	—
King's Letters	100386	6	6	Surplus on the Loan Duties, including 30000l. estimated as the Produce of the Tax on the Salaries and Pensions of Absentees for Two Years.	—	—	—
Expenditure on Military Contingencies	4181	11	0	—	1498590	4	—
Barracks	30945	2	10	By the foregoing Estimates the Revenues will be short of the National Expences	39674	4	—
Concordatum	31691	7	6	—	—	—	—
Prizage	8247	8	4	—	—	—	—
Commissioners of Accounts	3280	—	—	—	—	—	—
Bounty to the Linen Manufacture	8000	—	—	—	—	—	—
	305275	3	1	The Parliament have granted this	100000	—	—
Total National Expences for Two Years	1538264	8	1	Scillon in Aid of the Revenues, if any Deficiencies should arise	—	—	—
<i>Note</i> , The Methods of making the foregoing Estimates, are explained on the Back hereof.				If the foregoing Estimates should answer and the Revenues fall short of the National Expences, but	39674	—	—
				—	—	—	—
				The above Grant will exceed the Deficiency	60326	—	—
							B

The Charge of the Civil and Military Establishments are taken from the Certificates of the Auditor and Muster Master General's: there generally are considerable Savings on the Military Establishment, but they are so variable, that it would be very uncertain to Estimate them; yet we may depend on that Branch being reduced by them.

The Payments pursuant to Act of Parliament are taken from the Grants of this Session; and the usual Payments for Carriage of the Baggage of the Army, &c.

The King's Letters, Exceedings on Barracks and Military Contingencies, are taken from the Vice-Treasurer's Payments made the last Year, and the Exceedings on Concordatum, at a Medium of the last Six Years; the Payments in the last Year being an insufficient Guide, many Expences on that Head being usually paid about the Time the Chief Governor is leaving the Kingdom.

The Revenues are estimated at a Medium from the last Six Years, and the Sum of 30,000*l.* is estimated in the Loan Duties to arise from the Tax on the Salaries and Pensions of Absentees in Two Years.

By the foregoing Estimate, which is taken at the highest Calculation in the Articles of Charge for the ensuing two Years, as to the Produce of the Revenue ; and for two Years taken at a low Medium for six Years last past ; it appears, that the general publick Expence will not exceed the national Revenue for the ensuing two Years more than thirty nine thousand pounds, if the Revenue should continue without Diminution or Encrease : But notwithstanding this Estimate, there are good Grounds to hope, that there will be a considerable Encrease upon the public Revenues at large for the two ensuing Years, as may appear by the following Comparison of them in the nine Months ending at *Christmas 1766*, and the nine Months ending at *Christmas 1767*, by which there is an Encrease of 12160l. and had it been possible to have made up the last Quarter with the same Precision, there is the greatest Reason to believe from the Weekly Abstracts, that the Rise upon the fourth Quarter wou'd have been considerably higher than any of the foregoing.

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other three corners are blank.

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A Comparison of the Revenues in the Nine Months ending at *Christmas*, 1766, and the Nine Months ending at *Christmas*, 1767.

	I. s. d.	I. s. d.
I N the Nine Months ending at <i>Christmas</i> , 1766		I N the Nine Months ending at <i>Christmas</i> , 1767
Hereditary Revenue —	4977 64 11 9 $\frac{1}{4}$	5082 45 6 9 $\frac{1}{4}$
Old Additional Duties —	1824 67 19 10 $\frac{1}{4}$	180900 19 2
	<u>680232 11 8$\frac{1}{4}$</u>	<u>689146 5 11$\frac{1}{4}$</u>
Management and Expences —	1215 02 4 3 $\frac{1}{4}$	118283 18 5 $\frac{1}{4}$
Drawbacks —	2774 15 —	2746 6 8
	<u>124276 19 3$\frac{1}{4}$</u>	<u>121030 5 11$\frac{1}{4}$</u>
Net Revenues in the Nine Months ending at <i>Christmas</i> , 1766 —	555955 12 5	568116 — 9 $\frac{1}{4}$
	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
Gross Hereditary Revenue and Additional Duties in Nine Months to <i>Christmas</i> , 1767 —	689146 5 11 $\frac{1}{4}$	555955 12 5
In Nine Months ending <i>Christmas</i> , 1766 —	680232 11 8 $\frac{1}{4}$	555955 12 5
	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>
Expence of Management, Drawbacks, &c. 1766 —	124276 19 3 $\frac{1}{4}$	12160 8 4 $\frac{1}{4}$
Ditto, — — —	1767 — 121030 5 14	3246 14 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ Decrease.
Total Encræafe on the Net Revenues —		12160 8 4 $\frac{1}{4}$

It must also be considered, that the lowering the Duties upon Teas to prevent Smuggling, and to encourage the fair Trader, has been estimated by experienced Judges, as a contingent Encrease of the Revenue upon this Article of 20000*l.* *per ann.* but if we rate it at 10000*l.* we are certainly much below the Truth; so that upon the whole, there is a Sum already provided, more than sufficient to answer the Deficiencies of the next two Years: But as it was impossible to foresee what would be the Encrease of the Revenue, or that the King wou'd graciously consent to a Bill imposing a Tax on the Salaries and Pensions of Absentees; the House of Commons at the Beginning of this Session, did pass an Act of Credit for 10000*l.* to supply all Deficiencies, as stated in the preceding Estimate; which Sum, even supposing that the above Calculations were false, wou'd be sufficient of itself to make good all the Deficiencies for the next two Years, and also to answer the first Expence of the proposed Augmentation, until *Christmas, 1769,* three Months before which Time the Parliament will again meet in its usual Course, and may then make what Provision they shall think proper for it.

THE annual Encrease of Expence upon our Establishment, in Case that the proposed Augmentation shall be carried into Execution, is stated at 3596*l. 12s. 6d.* this Estimate is by no Means underrated to deceive the Publick by specious Appearances, as has been falsely insinuated, but is exact, and cannot be mistaken; the present yearly Charge of a Battalion on this Establishment is 8215*l. 10s. 10d.* the additional Encrease will exactly amount to 2229*l.*

10s. 10d. which being multiplied by 27, makes 60197l. 12s. 6d. from this Sum we are to deduct the Charge of three Regiments, whom we now pay, which are no longer to be continued on our Establishment, the Amount of which is 24509l. 15s. *per ann.* the Remainder is exactly 35961l. 12s. 6d.

THIS Estimate, it is true, does not include the Sums necessary for the Levy-Money, Arms, Accouplements, and extraordinary Cloathing of each Regiment; but, by the most exact Computation it appears, that the first of these Charges will amount to 21352l. 10s. at 5l. 8s. 4d. levy-Money for each Man; and the Arms and Accouplements and extra Cloathing to 12341l. 12s. 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. in all, 33694l. 2s. 10 $\frac{1}{2}$ d. being something less than one Year's pay. Now if we consider that it will take some Time to raise so great a Body of Men, and that they are not to be put upon our Establishment until they land in *Ireland*; we have not the least Reason to fear that a further Sum will be wanted to make up any extraordinary Expence than that which has been mentioned in the Estimate presented to the H— of C—; and which the publick Funds, as hath been already stated, will be more than sufficient to answer.

THE foregoing Calculations are indisputable, as well as the Observations which result from them. Figures like Facts are unanswerable. I shall therefore leave them to speak for themselves, and not tire the Reader's Patience, by a tedious Comment upon what needs no Explanation; I shall only make a few Observations upon some Objections, which may arise in the Reader's Mind, against some Part of this Plan of Augmentation, which popular Rumour,

Rumour, or the want of being rightly informed, may have suggested to him.

First, He may have heard, that however useful this Scheme may be, the Sense of Parliament has been declared against it; but this is not the Case, one House of Parliament hath given their Approbation to the Measure, whilst the other House, without expressing any Disapprobation of it, have only declared their Inability to lay any additional Burthen on the Establishment, so near the Close of the present Session, not having had sufficient Time to consider the State of the Country, and its Resources.

He may likewise think, that the keeping five Regiments on foreign Service, as is intended, will be a fresh Article of Expence upon us, as well as a new Encroachment upon our Establishment; but he will find upon Enquiry, that *Ireland* has at all Times contributed to the general Defence of *Great-Britain*, and to the common Cause; and that from the Revolution to the present Time, *Ireland* has always been paying Troops for other Purposes than its own immediate Defence. But still it may be asked, Why shou'd this Kingdom contribute to the Defence of the Colonies of *America*, where she is not allowed to Trade but under such Restrictions, as make it of little Value? Why shou'd the Addition of Territory there be urged as a Reason for us to encrease that Charge, when we can reap no Benefit from it? there is some Plausibility in this Complaint, if it were founded in Truth.

BUT

BUT our Trade to *America* has always been a Beneficial one, and has encreased so prodigiously since the Conclusion of the Peace, as to have become at this Time, one of the most valuable Branches of our Commerce.

It will give the Reader Pleasure I am sure, to be satisfied of this Matter, as he may be by inspecting the annexed Paper, which as it is curious and authentick, is worthy the Perusal of every Well-wisher to the Prosperity of *Ireland*.

Value

26
VALUE of the TRADE between IRELAND and the PLANTATIONS arising from the EXPORTS and IMPORTS, for Ten Years, *viz.* the next preceding Five Years, to the Commencement of the last WAR, compared with the last Five Years.

Five Years next preceding the Commencement of the last War.			Years ending the 25th of March.			Five Years PEACE.		
Value of Exports.	Value of Imports.	Exports exceed, the Gain to Ireland.	Value of Exports.	Value of Imports.	Exports exceed, the Gain to Ireland.	Value of Exports.	Value of Imports.	Exports exceed, the Gain to Ireland.
l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.	l. s. d.
155509 12 2½	86069 9 10½	69440 2 4½	1751	—	1763	286374 8 7½	88587 19 7½	197786 9 —
157982 10 3½	7703 — 4	80979 9 11	1752	—	1764	276875 7 10½	79399 15 11½	197475 11 11½
163354 2 3	120208 1 1	43146 1 2	1753	—	1765	211045 8 3	766555 7 3½	134390 — 11½
149590 19 9½	119245 2 1½	21345 17 7½	1754	—	1766	246134 14 2½	82434 — 2	167700 14 — 4
133544 19 3½	77021 14 8½	56523 4 6½	1755	—	1767	216699 18 1½	130317 6 5	86592 11 8½
750982 3 6½	479547 7 11½	271434 15 7½	Totals —	—	1237339 17 — 4	457394 9 4½	779945 7 7½	
150196 8 8½	95909 9 7	54286 19 1½	Medium —	—	247467 19 5	91478 17 10½	155989 1 6	

Medium of the Annual Gain, for the Five Years antecedent to the Commencement of the last War. } 54286 19 1
Gain upon the Five last Years exceeds the Five Years antecedent to the War annually, upon the Medium of both Periods. } 101702 2 5

By this it appears, that the annual Encrease upon the fair clear Profits of our *American* Trade, since the War, is 101702 pounds; a prodigious Amount, and a plain Proof, how much we are interested in the Defence of a Country, which yields us such a Profit; and how much we have been benefited by the late Accession of Territory to the *British* Crown, to which chiefly, if not solely, we must ascribe the aforesaid surprizing Acquisition of Trade.

IT may be alledged that an Estimate taken from the Custom-house Accounts of Exports is no positive proof of the real Value of a Trade, it being usual to over-rate those Articles, which pay no Duty for various commercial Reasons well known to the mercantile Part of the Kingdom; this Consideration may indeed make the exact Value of our Commerce more doubtful, but the Proportion of it in the two Periods before, and after the Peace, will still hold the same; whether this Circumstance be taken into the Account or not.

IT may also be alledged that it appears upon the View of this Estimate, that however the Trade may have seemed to encrease in the first Years after the Peace, it is now visibly declining again, and will probably continue so to do till it subsides down to its former Medium, as it stood before the Commencement of the War. But as this Decrease can only have arisen from the unhappy Differences which have lately subsisted between *Great-Britain* and her Colonies, and as those Differences seem now to be nearly at an End, there can hardly remain a Doubt, but that this Trade will again revive; and as the Inhabitants

Inhabitants of those Countries are daily encreasing to an amazing Degree, that their Commerce also will encrease and improve in the same Proportion.

I HAVE now laid before my Reader a true and impartial View of that great and most comprehensive Scheme for the Augmentation of the Army on the *Irish* Establishment, which has been so much talked of, and so little understood. — A Scheme calculated to answer the most important Ends of Government, *viz.* Strength abroad and Security at Home: Founded upon Principles of Justice and Wisdom, and fraught with the greatest Advantages to this Country in particular; however it may have been misrepresented by Faction, or misunderstood by Credulity.

WE have indeed been so much accustomed of late to be imposed on by specious Proposals of publick and national Undertakings, which have only ended in Expence, instead of Advantage, that some Jealousy and Suspicion of every new Design may at first be excusable; but we have here a Plan offered to us of the most interesting and extensive Utility; the Advantages of which will be felt as soon as the Expence, and much more sensibly, as it is calculated with the utmost Frugality.

BUT if after all, we dread this additional Charge, small as it is, upon our Establishment; if this Country is already so heavily taxed as to be unable to bear the least additional Weight, even for the most important Purposes; might we not hereafter spare something from other less interesting Calls, and shou'd we not then find the present Revenue

Revenue sufficient to support this Augmentation, without new Funds being created? Let those, who so movingly plead our Incapacity to assist his Majesty with any farther Supplies at this Time, remember, that when they were first call'd upon to support this Measure, if they had not been so profuse in their Grants to Undertakings of a less publick Nature, they wou'd not have rendered their Country incapable (if so it is) to have spar'd so small a Sum, as was required for its own Security.

F I N I S.

E R R A T U M.

P. 12. L. 28. for *Protection*, read *Privilege*.



МУЗЕЙ БРИТАНИИ